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Energy prices are remaining fairly constant while the federal budget is decreasing, 
which puts a larger burden on paying for energy costs out of a smaller BAH budgetary 
line item. Responsible use of energy incentive options are needed in privatized housing to 
effectively and efficiently utilize the Navy basic allowance for housing (BAH) system. 
The basic allowance for quarters / variable housing allowance (BAQ/VHA) system was 
modified in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998 due to out of 
pocket expenses exceeding 40 percent. The BAH system was further modified in 2005 to 
ensure zero percent out of pocket expense. The current system is now under fire to reduce 
costs. The 2015 Department of Defense (DOD) proposed budget targets BAH with a six 
percent decrease, equal to $448.8M. (Tilghman, 2014)  
The military is faced with a perception that our use of energy is excessive and not 
responsible when compared to the civilian sector and the current fiscal reality. As the 
military engagements around the world come to a close we will be faced with even 
tighter defense budget controls. The DOD must position itself to protect our core 
allowances while minimizing the impact on our operational readiness.  
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
As a team, we collected Navy personnel data from Defense Manpower Data 
Center Reporting System on privatized housing from 2007–2014 with rank info, number 
of bedrooms and location (Washington State, Norfolk, Jacksonville, and San Diego). We 
conducted an analysis of these data to identify any trends in the use of privatized housing 
to help forecast future Navy personnel utilization of privatized housing and to conduct a 
cost benefit analysis on both past and future aspects of the responsible use of energy in 
the Navy privatized housing BAH program. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Currently, privatized housing residents are not fully incentivized to conserve 
energy. The baseline policy which is governed by the Resident Energy Conservation 
Program (RECP) groups like-size homes together, which does not give the individual 
household the autonomy of conserving energy to the fullest extent. Energy averages for 
homes of the same size are used as a baseline by the contractors to justify the amount 
paid to the actual energy provider. These funds are taken out of BAH proceeds collected 
from the service member. Households that use more energy than the calculated baseline 
must pay the difference out of their own pocket.  
Water baselines in Navy privatized housing do not exist, therefore providing zero 
incentive to conserve water.  
1. Primary Research Question 
Null hypothesis: Military privatized housing communities conserve energy at a 
lower dollar amount per household member than their civilian counterparts in 
neighboring communities. 
Alternative hypothesis: Military privatized housing communities do not conserve 
energy at a lower dollar amount per household member than their civilian counterparts in 
neighboring communities. 
Utilizing our hypotheses we want to know: 
 How can cost reductions for DOD energy be realized though motivated, 
efficient energy usage among DOD personnel?  
 How might policy be changed to enable these savings? 
2. Secondary Research Question 
Our secondary research question is, “What are the realized savings between the 
two communities?” We then collected the relevant data from the civilian side and Navy 
privatized housing communities for statistical comparisons, computed and compared the 
percent of savings realized in the two communities to make our recommendations. 
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D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Our original research scope was to cover the period from the inception of the new 
BAH program in 1996 until 2013. Unfortunately, the variables that we wanted to include 
into our research were not accurately collected or kept until 2007. Therefore, the scope 
was narrowed to span from 2007 through 2014. We also had to narrow the scope of Navy 
military concentration areas from five down to four. Monterey, California had to be cut 
from our research because housing responsibilities and reporting for Monterey belongs to 
the U.S. Army and not the Navy. This limitation may affect the outcome of certain ranks 
within the study, since Monterey, California is a heavily populated area for naval officers. 
Our first assumption is that qualified prior enlisted officers (>4 years active 
service) are paid more in BAH than their peers in the same grade. (Ex. Monterey, CA O-
3E personnel are paid $2,946 per month with dependents while the O-3 peer receives 
$2,835 per month with dependents. We used the average of the two BAH rates in our 
calculations.) 
We assumed that household utility costs for electricity are the same for the entire 
household while water usage is allocated by number of bedrooms in the family’s home. 
The utility providers’ reported data were standardized into a single reporting 
period accordingly (e.g., Utility Company A reports data on a monthly basis while Utility 
Company B reports data on a quarterly basis). Also, it is assumed that the reader is 
familiar with standard DOD BAH policies and terminology. Further information is 
available at the Navy Personnel Command website: http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/support/distribution/Pages/BasicAllowanceForHousing.aspx. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The research was performed using two research strategies. The first strategy is 
based on an extensive literature review, including other theses, congressional testimony, 
Defense Department and Navy internal regulations, reports, policies and plans, articles, 
and web searches. Other sources of information involved communication with 
representatives at the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and Commander, Navy 
Installations Command (CNIC) N93. The second strategy was to conduct a statistical 
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analysis on data collected and provided to us by CNIC N93 in Washington D.C. These 
two strategies provided sufficient data to come to our conclusions and recommendations. 
Definitions and Abbreviations 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter II provides the reader with a 
historical context for how military housing came about, DOD’s World War II policies 
pertaining to housing and how these policies evolved up until the mid-nineties. It also 
includes an overview of the military construction (MILCON) funded housing program 
and three previous military funded privatized housing community projects. Chapter III 
explains how the current BAH came about in 1996, the two methods used to provide a 
military family with housing, how they function, the pros and cons associated with these 
methods, and service members’ housing preferences. Chapter IV outlines policy 
considerations that must be addressed in accordance with our findings. Chapter V 
presents the data, analysis and findings from this thesis. Chapter VI provides a brief 




In the current climate of budget reduction and spending cuts, it is of utmost 
importance for military members and leadership to make effective and efficient use of 
resources. One of these vital resources is a BAH that all military members are entitled to. 
Military members rely on BAH to cover most, if not all, of their housing expenses. 
Moreover, military family housing was designed so members would not need to spend 
more than their BAH allotment. That is, that their full entitlement would cover all rental 
and utilities costs associated with their place of residence in military housing.  
B. HISTORY 
Military housing has a history that traces its roots from the various economic 
hardships and conflicts in American landscape. In particular, Army military housing that 
was constructed during peacetimes were born out of necessity to keep the United States 
protected, specifically along its coastlines and slowly pushing west as that territory 
became developed by settlers. Military housing projects were initiated during peacetime 
when funding and resources were more readily available. When peacetimes turned to 
conflicts, funding and resources were diverted to support the war efforts. The amount of 
housing that could be built before or after conflicts was never fully able to address all 
housing needs for officers and enlisted. Various cycles of peacetime and conflict created 
a shortage in military housing for troops. Moreover, the existing housing near military 
installations were in a state of disrepair and continued to deteriorate.  
Twiss and Martin state that shortages in military housing were not new issues to 
the military (1998). The Army in particular experienced more housing shortages than the 
other services, mainly by virtue of their mission and land footprint the Army required. 
The authors noted one particular example at Fort Monroe that is indicative of the Army’s 
housing predicament from early on: 
Quarters One at Fort Monroe, probably the oldest housing now in the 
Army, was completed soon after the construction of the fortress began in 
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1819, but the construction of adequate quarters for officers and barracks 
for soldiers never kept up with the need. Inadequate money for 
maintenance and repair mean that over the years facilities deteriorated. 
Assignment to a permanent fortification on the coast did not guarantee 
good living conditions for officers, soldiers, or their families. (Twiss & 
Martin, 1998, p. 3) 
As the nineteenth century turned to the twentieth century, the Army created the 
military communities that are common on bases today. Amenities like gyms, libraries, 
and exchanges and school facilities were added to improve Army post quality of life for 
officers and soldiers. However, World War I curtailed any military community 
enrichment construction that had started in the early 1900s, and instead poured the 
nation’s resources into the war effort. Another cycle of prosperity and peacetime 
followed WWI, when military construction efforts picked up momentum again.  
As military construction projects picked up, the nation’s economy did too, which 
meant it was harder to retain military members when the job prospects were better during 
this period of peacetime. The Joint Service Pay Act of 1922 was enacted to help military 
retention efforts. The act provided military members with not only a base pay but 
provided allowances with their base pay. This Act deemed only officers worthy of such 
allowances, while enlisted would not receive any allowances until much later. One of the 
allowances paid to  
Warrant officers and officers during this time was a rental allowance for 
quarters when quarters were not available. This allowance was based on 
grade and the presence or absence of family members and based upon 
national monthly costs associated with renting one room. Larger families 
were authorized more rooms. (Twiss & Martin, 1998, p. 5)  
Enlisted had to wait until 1949 with the introduction of the Career Compensation System 
to receive a housing allowance, known at that time as BAQ.  
By 1949, Army ranks had grown so much that military housing available to troops 
was not enough to house all personnel who requested it. The Army experienced another 
lull in housing construction again when the U.S. entered WWII as resources and funds 
were needed for the war effort. Much of the existing housing for military members and 
their families had deteriorated to substandard level. The housing issue was so bad for 
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military families that it gained national attention in 1949 when Life magazine exposed 
the horrific conditions of the private rental housing they lived in when no government 
quarters were available. According to Baldwin, 
According to the Secretary of Defense, ‘rather than be separated from their 
families because of lack of Government quarters and scarcity of adequate 
rental housing at their places of assignment, many of the service personnel 
have accepted disgraceful living conditions in shacks, trailer camps and 
overcrowded buildings, many at exorbitant rents.’ Concerned about 
morale and reenlistment and resigned to the fact that Congress would not 
appropriate sufficient funds to solve the problem, the Defense Department 
sought new ways to address the housing crisis. (Baldwin, 1996, p. 9)  
In 1948, the Defense Department explored measures to address this issue since 
receiving sufficient funding from Congress to reduce the shortage or upgrade existing 
housing was unlikely. The Army reached out to the private sector, specifically insurance 
companies and businessmen in each localized post area, to produce viable solutions to the 
military housing shortage. The private sector voiced concerns over possible post closures 
and subsequent drawdown in troops as a business risk they may not be willing to take in 
building housing close to military bases. It was becoming clear that more would be 
needed to entice and attract private businesses to build rental housing for military 
families and for insurance companies to insure these projects for private business 
ventures (Baldwin, 1996).  
C. SENATOR KENNETH S. WHERRY 
Proposals to build more military housing got the boost it needed from Senator 
Kenneth S. Wherry (R-NE, 1943–1951), when many air bases closed in his home state 
because not enough housing was available to military personnel and their families. 
Baldwin states,  
During WWII, according to the senator, Nebraska had more than twenty 
air bases, all of which were closed after the war except for one installation 
at Kearney. ‘Then came an order that the base at Kearney was to be 
closed.’ The primary reason for closing the base was lack of adequate 
family housing. That experience led the senator to a better appreciation of 
the importance of family housing to the military services. (Baldwin, 1996, 
p. 1342) 
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Wherry’s bill had several components to entice private businessman, otherwise 
known as private sponsors, to build rental housing near government installations. One 
component, known as Title VIII of The National Housing Act, set favorable conditions 
that made it suitable for the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to grant mortgage 
insurance to private sponsors who used loans to build housing projects in the amount 
each military service quantified. (Baldwin, 1996) The private sponsored housing projects 
were considered rental housing and could be rented to military or civilians, despite the 
fact the housing was built near military installations on government owned land. The 
requirement was the rental housing must first rent to military members that wanted to rent 
in the Wherry housing, but then they could be rented out to anyone. Military members 
could pay for their rent by using their BAQ. Rental rates were not established solely on 
the amount a member received for BAQ. Rather, the “FHA established rental schedules 
for the units based on its estimate of the income private sponsors would need to operate 
and maintain the housing, repay the mortgage, and make a profit” (Baldwin, 1996). This 
is unlike rental schedules in military privatized housing today, which are based on a 
service member’s BAH. Moreover, since some of the rental housing locations were too 
far from regular utility company coverage, the Wherry bill allowed the Defense 
Department to take charge of utilities provided to these far removed locations. The utility 
management on behalf of the Defense Department was done in the interest of keeping 
rental rates low for service members.  
The Wherry bill became the Wherry Program and unfortunately the program was 
problematic in a few areas, ultimately leading to termination because of FHA and private 
sponsored builders’ scandals. Baldwin (1996) notes: 
The Department of Defense Housing Commission’s investigation 
confirmed the problems with the design and bidding processes and also 
discovered in the first few months of the Wherry program the flaw that 
would ultimately lead to its termination. Prospective sponsors, the 
investigation noted, appeared to be calculating their bids so that they built 
their projects for the amount of the mortgage they could obtain. Sponsors 
could thus avoid putting any of their own money into the project. In May 
1950, Congress passed legislation that authorized the services to hire 
architect-engineer firms to draw up plans and specifications upon which 
potential sponsors would bid. The winning bidder would then reimburse 
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the government for design services. Congress did not, however, address 
the more serious problem of what would later be excoriated as ‘windfall 
profits’ gained from building the projects for less than the amount of the 
FHA-insured mortgage. (Baldwin, 1996, p. 95) 
One of the major issues faced by builders was bid submissions for proposed 
housing designs did not have uniform architectural guidelines established by the 
government. Because there were no uniform guidelines bidders up designed their own 
structures, which left the services with a wide array of “proposals with designs and prices 
that were difficult to compare. In some cases the services picked proposals that the FHA 
later rejected because the schedule of rents was too low or the designs failed to meet FHA 
requirements” (Baldwin, 1996). To mitigate this problem the Defense Department 
provided military services the ability to use architectural firms to draw up designs that 
each bidder could use to base their own plans on and prevent FHA rejection. 
Another issue the Wherry Program had to contend with was the windfalls builders 
were trying to reap by building projects for much less than the mortgage amount. The 
issue became a full-blown scandal when a congressional investigation discovered that 
“unscrupulous builders aided by corrupt FHA officials had reaped enormous profits at the 
expense of the taxpayers” (Baldwin, 1996). As a result, a cost certification component 
was added to the program to ensure builders were not trying to build rental housing 
projects on the cheap and pocket the rest of the government funding to build these units 
as profit. This scandal was part of the reason the Wherry Program was terminated in 
1954. It was replaced by a new housing program, known as the Capehart Program. 
(Baldwin, 1996) 
D. CAPEHART WHERRY PROGRAM 
The Capehart Program was implemented to avoid the failings in the Wherry 
Program. The key differences between the programs, as noted by Baldwin (1996), are 
listed below: 
 FHA provided mortgage insurance for private sponsors who built, but did 
not operate, family housing units on government-owned or leased land. 
Typically the private sponsors operated the units, renting out and 
collecting rent from military members which they did so under the Wherry 
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Program. However in the Capehart Program the units would be turned 
over to the military services to operate and collect rent from service 
members. At this point the services used the service members’ entire 
housing allowance to operate and maintain the projects using appropriated 
funds. 
 The Secretary of Defense had to certify the need for family housing at an 
installation in order to initiate a project. If the FHA disagreed with the 
secretary’s determination, it could require the Defense Department to 
guarantee the new mortgage insurance fund against loss. The Wherry 
Program did not require such certifications and guarantees. 
 The military services retained architect-engineer firms to design the 
projects, which were advertised for bids. The Wherry Program allowed 
bidders to submit their own plans based on generic architectural guidelines 
from the military services specifications without employing the use of an 
architect-engineer firm.  
To deal with the fallout from the Wherry program windfall profit scandal, 
Congress implemented the Renegotiation Act of 1951. While this act did not make 
builders certify their costs, as they had to do in the Wherry program, it did allow the 
government to collect from builders who tried to reap excessive profits of taxpayer funds 
by building projects well short of the mortgage amount for the rental housing.  
The Capehart program experienced its fair share of problems, albeit different 
problems than Wherry’s issues. Congress reviewed the military housing program in 1962 
and heard from Defense Department testimony that neither Congress nor the Defense 
Department “have been satisfied with private financing since it is the most costly method 
of acquiring housing and proven difficult to administer’. Congress did not extend the 
Capehart program and voted to build family housing exclusively with appropriated 
funds” (Baldwin, 1996). A General Accounting Office (GAO) report provided more 
ammunition to this belief when in 1960 the GAO cited several concerns over the 
program. While Capehart units were given a specific cost ceiling that builders should 
only use in designated high cost areas, builders instead used this estimate for all project 
areas, not just the high cost ones. Another issue cited in the report was that builders 
overestimated the need for housing at military installations. Sponsors built too many units 
because they underestimated the amount of housing outside of military installations and 
the number of service members that would rather live off military installations. Finally, 
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the Capehart program experienced issues with private sponsors that steered Congress in 
the direction to discontinue the Capehart program. The administrative oversight was too 
cumbersome and not effective at preventing waste, fraud, and abuse and instead deemed 
future housing projects to be built with appropriated funds. Utilizing the private industry 
to build the units was too costly. (Baldwin, 1996) 
E. SECTION 801 AND 802 HOUSING 
Despite the scandals and problems that riddled the Wherry and Capehart 
programs, they did still manage to get the military services out of major housing crises 
during the 1940s to 1960s. But because both programs were susceptible to waste, fraud, 
and abuse of government funds on the part of private sponsors, they were cancelled, 
which left Congress with an understandable reluctance to do any further business with 
private sponsors that could lead to misuse of funds and future scandals. Not until 1984, 
when the Military Construction Authorization Act was enacted, did Congress and the 
president decide to allow private industry into building military family housing again. 
(Baldwin, 1996) 
The housing programs born from the 1984 Military Construction Authorization 
Act became known as the Section 801 and Section 802 programs. Section 801 program 
was a long-term lease program that “competitively bid leases and provide housing built to 
Defense Department specifications on either military or privately owned land” (Baldwin, 
1996) from contracted private builders. With this program the government had the option 
to perform the operations and maintenance on the housing units or allow the contractor to 
do it, whichever cost the government less. The contractors were not too particularly keen 
on taking on the maintenance of the units as this added cost made it difficult for them to 
secure funding to finance their projects. As with previous housing programs, the Section 
801 program had its share of problems. According to Baldwin, “Congress believed the 
Section 801 housing was overpriced, it was suspiciously popular with the Defense 
Department, and after 20 years of payments, the government got nothing” (1996). 
The Section 802 program was a rental guarantee program that provided housing in 
which rental rates were set at a level that service members could afford, essentially their 
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entire housing allowance amount. Contractors were not particularly enticed to want to 
build units for the Section 802 program, because rental rates were frozen for the life of 
the agreement and rental rates were set at a service members’ ability to pay for rent, 
essentially their BAQ amount. Contractors were also experiencing the same issues with 
financing that the Section 801 contractors had. To make the contract agreements more 
appealing to contractors, Congress made two changes to the law: They unfroze rental 
rates, allowing them to rise with inflation; and the allowed the government or a third 
party assume maintenance of the units to ease contractors’ financing difficulties. Despite 
these changes, the Section 802 program did not produce many housing units for rent. 
What eventually halted the Section 802 program and kept it from realizing its full 
potential was the cost of housing. Housing costs increased steadily and outpaced what 
service members were entitled to for BAQ. Since builders relied on BAQ to pay for rental 
rates, it was a loss builders were not willing to accept, as evident from the low rate of 
builder participation in the Section 802 program (Baldwin, 1996). 
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III. MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING (1996–PRESENT) 
In 1996, Congress authorized the Military Housing Privatization Initiative 
(MHPI), which led to the increase in basic allowance for housing for active duty 
members to achieve zero out of pocket housing expenses while living in off base 
privatized housing. 
A. MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE 
As reviewed in the Wherry and Capehart programs, there remained an 
insufficiency of housing units that was not satisfactory to the DOD. As a result, Congress 
implemented the MHPI in conjunction with the 1996 Defense Authorization Act. (GAO, 
1998) This initiative sought to include the private sector in the development of military 
housing. More specifically, Congress authorized the DOD to lease its property to the 
private sector, offer private businesses loans as needed in support of the initiative, and let 
private businesses build the military housing units with design similarities in the civilian 
markets. (GAO, 1998) By empowering the DOD to utilize private sectors, MHPI 
legislation afforded the DOD the flexibility to construct housing units comparable to 
civilian communities and stay free of the bureaucratic guidelines of Wherry and Capehart 
programs. (Else, 2001) MHPI allowed the DOD to assist in bringing quality and 
affordable military housing to the military family, thereby increasing morale and assisting 
in retention. 
B. THE MHPI PROCESS 
Before there can be any military housing, funds must be allocated to support its 
use. The MHPI process is an established procedure by Congress that authorizes the 
construction of these units through the Family Housing Improvement Fund under the 
annual Defense Authorization Act (Appendix B, Public Law 104-106, § 2883). The 
funding supports all MHPI projects that involve all contracting aspects to plan, solicit, 
award, administer and monetary injections required by the government for the initial 
phase (consult Appendix B, Public Law 104-106, § 2883). 
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1. Budget Scoring 
Before there can be any military housing, funds must be allocated to support its 
use. The MHPI process is an established procedure by Congress that authorizes the 
construction of these units through the Family Housing Improvement Fund under the 
annual Defense Authorization Act (Appendix B, Public Law 104-106, § 2883). The 
funding supports all MHPI projects that involve all contracting aspects to plan, solicit, 
award, administer and provide monetary injections required by the government for the 
initial phase (Appendix B, Public Law 104-106, § 2883). 
2. Budget Scoring 
MHPI has assigned a “budget score” to each of its projects. Conger writes, 
Budget scoring is the percentage of dollar value (from 0% to 100%) of a 
project’s cost that must be allocated to an agency’s budget in a given fiscal 
year. For example, if a project cost of $1 million is scored at 10%, then 
$100,000 of the agency’s budget authority for that year must be used to 
cover the assessment. According to OMB scoring guidelines, a project 
must be fully funded with sufficient budget authority in its first year to 
cover the government’s long-term financial commitment to the project. 
(Conger, n.d.) 
The scoring used for the MHPI was drafted to comply with the Federal Credit 
Reform Act of 1990 and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, as interpreted by Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 and specific MHPI guidelines issued by 
the OMB on June 25, 1997. These guidelines remained in effect for the first 20 projects 
using MHPI authorities, and will then be adjusted to incorporate lessons learned. The 
budget scoring is statistically derived from the probability that a private contractor would 
default on a project and the effect of the project’s default on the federal deficit (Else, 
2001). 
The Secretary of Defense delegated responsibility of operations for MHPI in 
October 1998 to the separate services. However, he gave oversight and final approval 
authority to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of Competitive Sourcing 
and Privatization (Else, 2001). Congress approves all projects and has oversight 
authority. On 9 October 1998, John B. Goodman, the Deputy Under Secretary for 
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Industrial Affairs and Installations, outlined in his memo on MHPI policies and 
procedures, the important steps and requirements throughout the housing project process 
to include post contract award management (Goodman, 1998). The memo also provided 
procedures and policies as guidelines to follow for privatization projects as well as 
supporting tools needed to accomplish these tasks (Goodman, 1998). MHPI projects 
should have a life cycle cost (LCC) savings that is beneficial to the military family 
housing (MFH) in order to be approved.  
C. OSD MHPI UTILITIES POLICY 
The Service components, through their OSD offices, released memos on policy 
guidance to ensure that all services are following the same MHPI process, to prevent 
unnecessary confusion, and to avoid delays that could slow down the process, as 
experienced in the previous years of the housing privatization projects. Also, John B. 
Goodman distributed a memo that covered the policy requirements for services involving 
utilities of MHPI projects. According to Mr. Goodman: 
Projects under this program must define the amount of rent available to the 
developer by subtracting from the BAH a predetermined amount set aside 
for utilities. This allowance for utilities would permit payment of utilities 
from within the BAH, either directly by the member or passed through the 
developer. This method will ensure that developers can appropriately 
estimate the amount of cash flow used to finance housing privatization 
projects. Service members who conserve utilities would be able to keep 
the difference between the allowance and the actual cost, whereas those 
who exceed the allowance would pay out-of-pocket for excessive usage. 
(Goodman, 1998) 
D. PRESENT 
This section will discuss whether or not unaccompanied housing is beneficial to 
the military as well as how the needs of junior enlisted personnel and their family’s needs 
are met in military family housing. Finally, the responsibilities of the service members to 
pay for utilities will be discussed.  
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1. Unaccompanied Housing 
Since the enactment of the MHPI, , several analyses have been performed, from 
1997 through 2011, by the different military services to decide if it is beneficial to keep 
the privatized housing for unaccompanied personnel. The Army’s and the Navy’s 
analyses differed by either using either privatization or the funding from traditional 
military construction for better housing quality. They utilized many installations for their 
analyses. On the other hand, the Air Force and Marine Corps used only a few 
installations to analyze the cost savings of privatizing unaccompanied housing. As such, 
the Air Force used two locations whereas the Marine Corps use one location for its 2008 
analysis. However, the Army and Navy focused their analyses to specific installations in 
which their unaccompanied service members were in receipt of BAH. The Air Force and 
Marine Corps came to the conclusion that privatization did not meet their housing needs. 
The Air Force released a memorandum in April 2000 stating that privatization was 
detrimental to unit cohesion. Also, other factors influencing the military services’ 
decision on privatized housing include junior personnel lacking sufficient BAH to pay 
rent, timeliness of unit deployments affecting the rates of occupancy in these privatized 
housing units, and uncertainty of what the military numbers would look like in the future, 
thereby leading to a possibility of lower demand for privatized housing. Between 1996 
and 2013, the Army and Navy implemented seven privatized unaccompanied personnel 
housing projects, whereas the Air Force and Marine Corps is using military construction 
funds to replace or renovate housing by the end of the fiscal year 2014. Based upon 
information from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and officials overseeing military 
housing, no services are planning to seek privatized housing projects for unaccompanied 
personnel in the future. (GAO, 2014) 
2. Military Family Housing 
According to DOD 4165.63-M for “Guidance,” housing privatization projects 
must specifically identify how the needs of junior enlisted personnel and their families 
are met at the particular installation. If a proposed project is not specifically targeted for 
junior enlisted personnel and their families, the Military Department must identify and 
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explain how alternative housing addresses their needs. Leverage ratios measure the 
advantage of using privatization versus traditional MILCON techniques in terms of 
upfront budget costs. This leverage calculation requires estimating the cost of a MILCON 
project that is equivalent in scope and duration to the proposed privatization project. That 
MILCON cost is then divided by the scored cost of the privatization project. Housing 
privatization projects should leverage appropriations by at least two to one, meaning a 
project or project phase should generate twice the amount of housing construction as 
would be generated using MILCON. Overall long-term costs should be less than or equal 
to MILCON. For the purposes of this program, this analysis compares the cost to the 
Government of a MILCON project that is equivalent in scope and duration to the cost of 
the proposed privatization project. (DOD, 2010) 
a. Utilities 
Tenants residing in privatized housing are responsible for paying both their rent 
and their utility bills. The housing owners may set rents at an amount equal to the 
tenants’ BAH, reduced by an amount that allows the tenants to pay for their utility usage 
and renters’ insurance. The rent reduction should be calculated based on a reasonable 










IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
MFH energy consumption has historically been higher than their civilian 
counterparts in neighboring communities. The federal budget has been decreasing. 
Therefore, a reduction in energy consumption is vital for DOD to stay within the confines 
of a reduced budget. Service members’ BAH, which they use to pay for utilities and rent, 
has been targeted for a reduction in 2015 by the DOD. Therefore, energy conservation 
efforts and accurate energy baselines should be established to help service members 
minimize the impact of the reduction to their BAH. 
Energy savings will be easier to identify once utility baselines have been 
established. “Protocols to estimate annual community energy consumption baselines for 
single-family detached homes can be used to make direct comparisons of individual 
households’ energy consumption and evaluate the energy impacts of programs used to 
affect change in consumer energy consumption” (Jones, Taylor, Kipp, and Knowles, 
2010). Utility baselines could be and should be constructed from the following data 
(Jones et al., 2010) and (Sonderegger, 1998): 
 Actual metered monthly energy consumption 
 property appraiser data that provides basic building characteristics of 
individual homes 
 correlation of past utility bills with past weather 
 past usage variables such as hours of occupancy and when units are 
unoccupied 
 number of occupants 
Compiled data collection that spans one to two years of actual data is preferable to 
an estimate when creating a utility baseline. Estimates should not be used if actual data is 
present. One to two years of data should provide adequate basis to help determine any 
existence of correlation between variables. Collection of more than two years of data may 
become problematic since “spanning several years may inadvertently capture the effects 
of past events and trends irrelevant to current usage patterns” (Sonderegger, 1998). 
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After a baseline has been constructed from the relevant data, an energy 
conservation program should be implemented. Two opportunities to create energy 
conservation by military housing residents are physical improvements installed in 
existing housing and inducing changes in residents’ energy usage behaviors. In order to 
physically implement measures to create energy conservation for MFH residents, Jones, 
Taylor, Kipp and Knowles (2010) recommend using the Department of Energy’s 
Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) model to update and retrofit existing housing 
with efficient energy equipment. WAP upgrades “include a wide variety of energy 
efficiency measures that encompass the building envelope, its heating and cooling 
systems, its electrical system, and electricity consuming appliances” (DOE, n.d.). 
The second strategy to produce energy conservation is to induce residential 
behavior that results in conserving energy. Allcott (2009) states that to effect behavioral 
changes on psychological cues a home energy report detailing the residents’ historical 
energy usage is needed for each family living in MFH. According to Allcott, the Home 
Energy Report contains two principal features:  
The first feature is an Action Steps Module that provides information, 
specifically targeted to each household, on strategies to conserve energy. 
The second feature is a Social Comparison Module that details the 
household’s electricity consumption and compares it to that of its one 
hundred nearest geographical neighbors in houses of comparable size. 
(Alcott, 2009)  
Showing residents how they compare with respect to their neighbors in energy 
consumption can induce residents to conserve more through social norming behavior. 
The residents who are not conserving as much as their neighbors may feel the 
psychological cue to conform their behavior with the social norm and alter their behavior 
to bring it more in line with their neighbors’ energy conservation behavior. However, 
according to Allcott (2009) there is a time limit to how much residents will continue to 
normalize their behavior with their neighbors before this norming behavior starts to 
decay. Research cited by Allcott suggests residents who received a monthly versus a 
quarterly report maintained their norming behavior consistently month to month due to 
improved feedback frequency (2009).  
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Residents who received only a quarterly report demonstrated a strong norming 
behavior at the beginning of the reporting period. However, as the quarter progressed, 
their energy conservation levels worsened. Upon receipt of the new Home Energy Report, 
the residents’ behavior improved again. Allcott cautions that residents who had strong 
energy conservation behavior to begin with may experience a reverse or regression in 
their behavior when comparing their behavior with less energy conservation behavior 
norms of their neighbors (2009).  
After picking an energy conservation program or programs to implement in 
existing military housing, the next step could be to develop a means of tracking the 
performance of the program. Sonderegger (1998) recommends completing a timeline 
with three phases to evaluate an energy conservation program. Three separate time 
periods would be utilized: 
 Tuning Period which is used to establish a reliable correlation of past 
utility bills; 
 Installation Period during which the physical improvements would be 
implemented or home energy reports initiated or both measures. 
 Performance Period during which utility savings resulting from the 
measures are monitored. 
In order for the tuning period to be effective, at least one year’s worth of bills 
should be used. Sonderegger (1998) recommends excluding bills from the baseline only 
in extreme circumstances where a bill may be higher because of an anomaly like “an 
equipment malfunction that was subsequently repaired. However, eliminating bills that 
contain periods of non-occupancy too often can result in a chronic over-estimate of future 
baselines during the same period.”  
After the tuning and installations periods have been established, it is important to 
periodically review the program throughout the performance period. Ideally, the 
performance period can provide program reviewers with insight into whether the 
psychological cues from the home energy reports or physical improvements installed in 
housing are having the intended effect on military housing resident behavior. 
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V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, DATA PRESENTATION, AND 
ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter discusses the research methodology and data used to calculate and 
study the monetary benefits of energy conservation to service members living in Navy 
privatized housing communities and to the DOD and taxpayers. 
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
It is the goal of our study to collect and use the most relevant and up to date data 
as possible. The data sources evaluated and used included CNIC N93 database 
information on Navy privatized housing projects, government publicized BAH rates from 
2007–2014, geographic specific energy providers for the four areas of interest, the 
Department of Housing, and Urban Development (HUD), and the internet. Unfortunately, 
data for the civilian counterparts in the same geographical area are not as readily 
available as we hoped. With this in mind, historic averages of electricity and water from 
the energy providers were used in our analysis.  
Collecting data on the Navy privatized housing project was relatively 
straightforward. A request for data was input into the DMDC website. We were contacted 
by DMDC to advise us that the data we requested would be provided by CNIC N93. 
CNIC N93 contacted us to clarify our request. We received data on the Navy privatized 
housing projects from 2007–2014.  
In collecting energy rate data, the internet was used to obtain the current rates for 
electricity and water from the geographic specific energy providers. 
Data on rental prices was collected using the HUD annual Fair Market Rent 
(FMR) data. The HUD basis for setting fair market FMRs are estimates of rent plus the 
cost of utilities, except telephone. FMRs are housing market-wide estimates of rents that 
provide opportunities to rent standard quality housing throughout the geographic area in 
which rental housing units are in competition. The level at which FMRs are set is 
expressed as a percentile point within the rent distribution of standard quality rental 
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housing units in the FMR area. FMRs are set at either the 40th or 50th percentile rent—
the dollar amount below which the rent for 40 or 50 percent of standard quality rental 
housing units falls. The 40th or 50th percentile rent is drawn from the distribution of rents 
of all units that are occupied by recent residents. Adjustments are made to exclude public 
housing units, newly built units and substandard units (ECFR, 2014). 
Based on its surveys, HUD publishes fair market rents for zero, one, two, three, 
and four or more bedroom units at the 40th percentile. The data received from HUD 
appears to be a weighted average of the five possible scenarios. Although their reasoning 
is not explained, HUD estimates that their RDD telephone surveys are within three to 
four percent of the actual rent value. (ECFR, 2014) 
C. DATA PRESENTATION 
All data was entered into Excel spreadsheets for ease of processing. Separate 
spreadsheet tabs were created for each of the four Navy privatized housing project that 
was analyzed. All relevant data pertaining to each geographic location (e.g. Rank 
specifics, household size, FMR rates, energy rates, and local BAH rates) were entered 
into the appropriate tab. We conducted trend analysis to see which ranks were utilizing 
MFH at the highest rate and to project the MFH utilization in future years. This analysis 
would also provide leadership with an insight into which service members that should be 
counseled on a more frequent basis on energy conservation and its benefits to the service 
member, the government, and society as a whole. The data was then used to calculate the 
potential savings to the DOD and taxpayers by utilizing our recommended FMR 
program, which uses the FMR rate coupled with a baseline allowance for utilities for the 
geographic area. Table 1 shows an example of the rank breakdown and residency data for 





Table 1.   Sample of CNIC N93 data for San Diego, CA (from V. Greene, 
personal communication, September 17, 2014) 
FISCAL 
YEAR BEDROOMS E-1 E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 
2014 TWO BDRM 89 228 653 698 620 
2014 THREE BDRM 24 84 325 544 1,094 
2014 FOUR BDRM 7 14 55 160 490 
2014   130 343 1,073 1,428 2,243 
  
Number of residents in MFH 
 
Table 2 shows the FMR in each of the naval concentration areas that are a part of 
the study. The FMR used for our study is from the HUD annual FMR. 
Table 2.   HUD annual FMR values (after HUD, 2014) 
Fair Market Rent Value 2014 
Everett, WA 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom 4 Bedroom 
  $1123 $1655 $1989 
Bremerton, WA       
  $951 $1366 $1628 
Whidbey Island, WA       
  $896 $1320 $1381 
San Diego, CA       
  $1354 $1969 $2398 
Jacksonville, FL       
  $935 $1233 $1509 
Norfolk, VA       
  $1130 $1562 $1966 
 
Tables 3 shows the Puget Sound Energy rates for the three naval concentration 
areas in the state of Washington. Table 4 shows the Washington Suburban Sanitary 
Commission water rates for the three naval concentration areas in the state of 
Washington. Tables 5 and 6 show the energy and water rates for San Diego, CA. Tables 7 
and 8 show the energy and water rates for Jacksonville, FL. Tables 9 and 10 show the 
energy and water rates for the Hampton Roads area in Virginia. Table 11 shows the 2014 
approved BAH rates for E-1 through E-9 in the cities of our study. 
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Table 3.   Puget Sound Energy electricity rates for 2014 (after Johnson, 
2013) 
Puget Sound Energy 
Average kWh/customer in 2013 (903 kWh) 
$0.085578  per kWh for the first 600 kWh $51.35  
$0.104157  per kWh after first 600 kWh $31.56  
Total Cost 903 kWh $82.91  
Table 4.   Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission water rates for 2014 
(after “Water Usage,” 2014) 
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission 
Number of family members (70 gallons 




3 6300 $53.36  
4 8400 $71.15  
5 10500 $88.94  
Average Daily Consumption by 
Customer Unit During Billing Period 
(Gallons per Day) 
Combined Water & Sewer Rate 
Per 1000 gallons 
50 – 99 $8.47  
 
Table 5.   San Diego Gas & Electric electricity rates for 2014 (after 
“Schedule DR Residential Service,” 2014) 
San Diego Gas & Electric 
Average kWh/customer in 2013 (573 kWh) 
$0.164740  per kWh Summer $94.40  
$0.164740  per kWh Winter - 
Total Cost 903 kWh $94.40  
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Table 6.   San Diego County Water Authority water rates for 2014 (after 
“Water Rates,” 2014) 
San Diego County Water Authority 
Number of family members (156.45 




3 14080.5 $71.51  
4 18774 $97.11  
5 23467.5 $122.71  
Service price: 
 Water ($3.64 per CCF 0 to 8 CCF) 
 Water ($4.08 per CCF 9 to 24 CCF) 
 
Table 7.   Jacksonville Electric Authority electricity rates for 2014 (after 
“Rates,” 2012) 
Jacksonville Electric Authority 
Average kWh/customer in 2013 (1076 kWh) 
$0.11  per kWh $118.36  
$5.00  Customer Charge $5.00  
Total Cost 1076 kWh $123.36  
 
Table 8.   Jacksonville Electric Authority water rates for 2014 (after “Rates,” 
2012) 
Jacksonville Electric Authority 
Number of family members (200 




3 18,000 $151.98  
4 24,000 $191.82  
5 30,000 $227.64  
Service price: 
 Water and Environmental ($1.30 per CCF 1 to 6 CCF) 
 Water and Environmental ($2.97 per CCF 7 to 20 CCF) 
 Water and Environmental ($5.97 per CCF >20) 
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Table 9.   Dominion Virginia Power electricity rates for 2014 (after 
“Schedule 1 Residential Service,” 2013) 
Dominion Virginia Power 
Average kWh/customer in 2013 (1117 kWh) 
$0.022580  per kWh for the first 800 kWh $18.06  
$0.012850  per kWh after first 800 kWh $4.07  
Total Cost 1117 kWh $22.14  
 
Table 10.   Hampton Roads Sanitation District water rates for 2014 (after 
“Water and Sewer Rates,” 2014) 
Hampton Roads Sanitation District 
Number of family members (60 gallons of 





3 5400 $32.13  
4 7200 $116.03  
5 9000 $144.78  
Service price: 
 Water ($4.45 per CCF) 
 Sewer ($3.67 per CCF) 
 Wastewater ($3.83 per CCF) 
 Service Charge ($1.00 per month) 
 
Table 11.   Sample of approved 2014 BAH rates for the geographical areas of 
the study (after “2014 BAH Rates with Dependents,” 2014) 
2014 BAH rates 
Location E-1-E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 
WA307—Everett $1,473  $1,599  $1,638  $1,767  $1,911  $2,055  
WA306—Bremerton $1,134  $1,212  $1,269  $1,434  $1,614  $1,779  
WA312—Whidbey Island $1,035  $1,110  $1,392  $1,476  $1,569  $1,659  
CA038—San Diego $1,971  $2,052  $2,226  $2,331  $2,448  $2,598  
FL058—Jacksonville $1,359  $1,467  $1,593  $1,623  $1,656  $1,734  
VA298—
Norfolk/Portsmouth 




This section analyzes the trends in MFH utilization and discusses and presents the 
total yearly savings for 2014 in the Navy MFH communities of our study.  
1. Trend Analysis 
When analyzing the trends of MFH utilization, four instances stood out from the 
rest of the study. Table 12 shows the trend in MFH utilization for the ranks of E-1 
through E-4 in Bremerton, WA. This demographic was the group that had the highest rate 
of change in MFH utilization between the years of 2007 and 2014. E-1s had a 100 
percent increase of MFH utilization over the seven year period. E-2s had a 62 percent 
increase, E-3s had a 105 percent increase and E-4s had a 38 percent increase from 2007-
2014. All other ranks in Bremerton and the rest of Washington State stayed relatively the 
same or decreased slightly in tenancy for that time period. 
Table 13 shows that the E-1 to E-5 demographic in San Diego is utilizing 
privatized housing. While the E-1 to E-4 ranks are residing in MFH at an increasing rate, 
it is noteworthy to show that E-5 families are not living in MFH as much in 2014 
compared to 2007.  
 The naval base at Mayport Florida has a much smaller population of navy 
families compared to San Diego, but the same negative trend is apparent in E-5 MFH 
tenancy. The only rank having a positive trend is E-7. These trends may stem from the 
decommissioning of the Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates. Eight out of 
eleven frigates that were in active service in 2007 are now decommissioned, and the final 
three frigates are set to be decommissioned in 2015. 
Table 15 shows that Norfolk junior enlisted sailors are choosing to reside in MFH 
much more in 2014 compared to 2007 with the E-3 demographic having a 130 percent 




Table 12.   Trend Analysis of E-1 through E-4 FMH utilization  
in Bremerton, WA 
 
Table 13.   Trend Analysis of E-1 through E-5 FMH utilization  




























































Table 14.   Trend Analysis of E-3 through E-7 FMH utilization  
in Mayport, FL 
 





























































With the exception of Mayport, FL, the trend analysis shows that the junior 
enlisted personnel (E-1 through E-4) are residing in MFH at a higher percentage now 
than 2007. The analysis of the senior enlisted and officer personnel is inconclusive, due 
to the smaller population of their ranks as well as those demographics low actual use of 
MFH.    
2. Total Yearly Savings for 2014 
The total yearly savings of each naval concentration area in our study was 
calculated utilizing 2014 information. Table 16 below is a sample of a two bedroom 
home in San Diego, CA for the ranks of E-1 to E-5 with the total savings being that of all 
ranks, E-1 to O-7. There was no data on the actual number of dependents living in MFH 
units in the CNIC N93 database. Therefore, we assumed that three people will live in a 
two bedroom home, four people will live in a three bedroom home, and five people will 
live in a four bedroom home. 2014 BAH and FMV rates were used to calculate the ability 
of the service member to pay for his/her MFH unit. The baseline energy costs were 
calculated using the historical averages for monthly electricity consumption as well as the 
amount of water used per day per person and then subtracted from the difference in BAH 
and FMV. If the calculation is positive, that number was multiplied by 12 to get the 
yearly savings per service member. This number was then multiplied by the number of 
service members who resided in the same location and same size home for a total yearly 
savings of that demographic. These steps were replicated for all ranks, locations, and 
house size to calculate the overall realized savings for the study. 
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Table 16.   2 Bedroom total yearly savings for E-1 through O-7 in San Diego, 
CA 
San Diego 2 
Bedroom  
Rank 
E-1 E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 
Family Size 3 3 3 3 3 
BAH (As of 
January 2014) 
$1,971  $1,971  $1,971  $1,971  $2,052  
Fair Market Value 
(San Diego, CA) 
$1,354  $1,354  $1,354  $1,354  $1,354  
Baseline Utilities 
(San Diego Gas & 
Electric) 
          
  Electricity 
($0.16474 per 
kWh) 
$94.40  $94.40  $94.40  $94.40  $94.40  
Water (156.45 
gallons per day 
per person) 




$5,413  $5,413  $5,413  $5,413  $6,385  
Yearly Budget 






0  $3,958,785  
Total Savings for 




     
Using the approach above, the overall realized savings for the three naval bases in 
Washington, San Diego, Jacksonville and neighboring Mayport, as well as Norfolk, were 
totaled, for a saving to the Navy of $22.6M. This number is far from the 2015 DOD 
proposed budget cut of $448.8M, but our study only encompasses a fraction of CONUS 






Table 17.   Overall realized savings for the study 
 
Total Savings for Washington (2014) $1,276,347  
Total Savings for San Diego (2014) $19,257,900  
Total Savings for Greater Jacksonville (2014) $488,228  
Total Savings for Norfolk (2014) $1,557,583  





VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During Congressional testimony on 13 March 2002, Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD 
for Installations and Environment, explained the urgent need to improve military family 
housing conditions saying,  
We’re competing with the private sector for the best young people in our 
country. We can’t simply count on their patriotism and their willingness to 
sacrifice alone. Sustaining the quality of life of our people is crucial to 
recruiting, crucial to retention, and especially crucial to our readiness to 
fight. (DuBois, 2002) 
This chapter addresses our thesis primary and secondary research questions, based 
upon the researchers’ literature review and analysis. This chapter also provides our 
recommendations and areas for further research. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION ANSWERS 
According to VADM Cullom’s NAVADMIN released in 2012 announcing the 
Navy’s Resident Energy Conservation Program, “Research confirms that service 
members (And their families) currently use more utilities than their private sector 
counterparts” (Cullom, 2012). Therefore, we are able to reject our null hypothesis that 
military privatized housing communities conserve energy at a lower dollar amount per 
household member than their civilian counterparts in neighboring communities. 
Conversely, we would not reject our alternative hypothesis that military privatized 
housing communities do not conserve energy at a lower dollar amount per household 
member than their civilian counterparts in neighboring communities. In support of 
ongoing DOD budget cuts, future research should retest our null and alternative 
hypotheses to validate our analysis. The following two questions are answered in our 
BAH and Utilities conclusions and recommendations below. 
 How can cost reductions for DOD energy be realized though motivated, 
efficient energy usage among DOD personnel?  
 How might policy be changed to enable these savings? 
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1. BAH 
The following section discusses the BAH conclusions and recommendations from 
our study. 
a. Conclusions 
Due to perceptions and current fiscal realities and ongoing budgetary reviews of 
our allowances, the goal of protecting these allowances while conserving and using 
energy responsibly can be achieved by modifying relevant U.S. Code and Public Law on 
this issue, thereby saving money for the US government. This modification would result 
in $22.6 million in savings for the U.S. Navy for FY 2014. 
b. Recommendations 
We recommend the Congressional Liaison Office engage members of the House 
and Senate Armed Services committees to put forth legislation to modify 37 U.S.C. § 
403: U.S. Code -Section 403 to change the amount of BAH authorized from “Adequate 
housing” to “Fair Market Value of housing” and subsequently modify PUBLIC LAW 
104–106—FEB. 10, 1996, 110 Stat 186 Section 2801, revoking the authority of the 
Secretary to pay money to the lessor in addition to that already paid by the members. 
2. Utilities 
The following section discusses the utilities conclusions and recommendations 
from our study. 
a. Conclusions 
The amount of utilities consumed has historically been higher in MFH units 
compared to their civilian counterparts living in the same geographical area. MFH tenants 
had little regard for conservation of energy and consumed more utilities since they were 
provided with no out of pocket cost to the tenant until the DOD adopted the Resident 
Energy Conservation Program (RECP). In September 2010, RECP was initiated as a pilot 
program in Hawaii, resulting in a 10 percent reduction in utility usage. While this is a 
certainly a good start, the full realization of savings to the DOD and service member will 
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not be realized until a program is put into place where the tenant is fully responsible for 
their own household’s use of energy. 
b. Recommendations 
We recommend the Congressional Liaison Office engage members of the House 
and Senate Armed Services committee’s to put forth legislation to modify 37 U.S.C. § 
403: U.S. Code -Section 403 to change the amount of BAH authorized from “Adequate 
housing” to “Fair Market Value of housing” and subsequently modify PUBLIC LAW 
104–106—FEB. 10, 1996, 110 Stat 186 Section 2801, revoking the authority of the 
secretary to pay money to the lessor in addition to that already paid by the members. 
These actions would allow for a new program to be adopted where each MHF would pay 
for their own household’s use of energy utilizing a baseline allowance for utilities. The 
baseline allowance for utilities would be constructed for each geographical area based on 
that regions energy provider’s historical average.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 What is the net impact of lower BAH rates. Will it increase demand for 
MFH? 
 Will civilian landlords decrease their prices as BAH decreases? 
 What is the effect on Navy retention of service members as BAH 
decreases? 
 What are the MFH potential realized savings if the same study as this one 
was done for the rest of the DOD? 
 What kind of ROI could be realized if the DOD were to invest in solar 
cities to power the MFH projects?  
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